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Power Posing: P-Curving the Evidence
Abstract
In a well-known article, Carney, Cuddy, and Yap (2010) documented the benefits of “power posing”. In their
study, participants (N=42) who were randomly assigned to briefly adopt expansive, powerful postures
sought more risk, had higher testosterone levels, and had lower cortisol levels than those assigned to
adopt contractive, powerless postures. In their response to a failed replication by Ranehill et al. (2015),
Carney, Cuddy, and Yap (2015) reviewed 33 successful studies investigating the effects of expansive vs.
contractive posing, focusing on differences between these studies and the failed replication, to identify
possible moderators that future studies could explore. But before spending valuable resources on that, it
is useful to establish whether the literature that Carney et al. (2015) cited actually suggests that power
posing is effective. In this paper we rely on p-curve analysis to answer the following question: Does the
literature reviewed by Carney et al. (2015) suggest the existence of an effect once we account for
selective reporting? We conclude not. The distribution of p-values from those 33 studies is
indistinguishable from what is expected if (1) the average effect size were zero, and (2) selective
reporting (of studies and/or analyses) were solely responsible for the significant effects that are
published. Although more highly powered future research may find replicable evidence for the purported
benefits of power posing (or unexpected detriments), the existing evidence is too weak to justify a search
for moderators or to advocate for people to engage in power posing to better their lives.
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In a well-known article, Carney, Cuddy, and Yap (2010)
documented the benefits of power posing. In their study,
participants (N = 42) who were randomly assigned to briefly
adopt expansive, powerful postures sought more risk, had
higher testosterone levels, and had lower cortisol levels than
those randomly assigned to adopt contractive, powerless
postures. This result has led some individuals to recommend power posing as a way to improve performance and
life outcomes (e.g., Blodget, 2013; Cuddy, 2012).
Despite the attention Carney et al.’s (2010) study has
received, there had until recently been no attempts to
closely replicate its methods. Ranehill et al. (2015), using
a larger sample (N = 200) and similar but not identical
procedures, found that although adopting powerful postures led to self-reported increases in feelings of power
(thus verifying the effectiveness of Carney et al.’s manipulation), it did not affect participants’ behavior or hormonal levels.1
In their response to the failed replication, Carney,
Cuddy, and Yap (2015) reviewed 33 successful studies
investigating the effects of expansive versus contractive
posing, focusing on differences between these studies
and the failed replication to identify possible moderators
that future studies could explore. But before spending
valuable resources on that, it is useful to establish whether
the literature that Carney et al. (2015) cited actually suggests that power posing is effective.
It may seem that the existence of 33 supportive published studies is enough to conclude that there is an effect
of expansive versus contractive posture on psychological
outcomes. However, one needs to account for selective
reporting. If results get published only when they show an
effect, the fact that all the published evidence shows an
effect is not diagnostic (see, e.g., Pashler & Harris, 2012).
In this Commentary, we rely on p-curve analysis to
answer the following question: Does the literature
reviewed by Carney et al. (2015) suggest the existence of
an effect once one accounts for selective reporting? We
conclude that it does not. The distribution of p values from
those 33 studies is indistinguishable from what would be

expected if (a) the average effect size were zero and (b)
selective reporting (of studies or analyses) were solely
responsible for the significant effects that were published.
Our results do not imply, nor could they imply, that the
effect size examined in these studies is exactly zero. It is
possible that it is undetectably small in the predicted direction, say r = .03, or in the unpredicted direction, say r =
−.03. But p-curve’s estimates are precise enough to allow
one to reject effects that would have been detectable in
the power-posing studies cited by Carney et al. (2015).
Thus, what the results do imply is that direct replications
of these studies would not be expected to succeed.
The next three sections give an overview of selective
reporting and p-curve analyses. Readers familiar with
these topics may safely skip ahead to the Results section.

Selective Reporting
Statistically significant results are more likely to be published than results that are not significant (Greenwald,
1975; Rosenthal, 1979; Sterling, 1959; Sterling, Rosenbaum,
& Weinkam, 1995). Selective reporting comes in at least
two forms. One form, file-drawering (Rosenthal, 1979),
involves the selective reporting of individual studies that
are statistically significant. For example, a researcher may
run five studies investigating the same effect but then only
report the one study that achieved statistical significance,
keeping the remaining four in the file drawer. (Or equivalently, five researchers may each run one study, but only
the researcher who obtains a p < .05 publishes it.)
The other form of selective reporting is known as
p-hacking (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014a),
which consists of conducting alternative analyses on the
same data set and then selectively reporting those that
provide statistically significant support for a publishable
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claim. For example, researchers may attempt to control
for different variables, to exclude participants they had
previously included, to log-transform the dependent variable, to analyze a few more (or fewer) participants than
planned, etc., until reaching a p < .05 (Simmons, Nelson,
& Simonsohn, 2011).
Both forms of selective reporting threaten the validity
of the published literature by hiding from view unsupportive (nonsignificant) results. This leads one to mistakenly conclude that an effect is larger than it actually is, or
even that an effect is real when it actually is not.
A variety of statistical techniques exist to determine
whether selective reporting is present in a literature (Egger,
Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997; Ioannidis & Trikalinos,
2007; Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005). These tools
can be used to answer the question, are there some studies
or results we are not observing in this literature? (Francis,
2014; Ioannidis, 2011; Schimmack, 2012). However, they
cannot be used to answer what is, in our view, the more
important question: Once one accounts for selective reporting, do the observed results suggest that the effect is real?
Answering this question requires correcting for selective
reporting rather than just diagnosing its existence.
The most common approach to correcting for selective reporting is the trim-and-fill procedure (Duval &
Tweedie, 2000). Unfortunately, it performs very poorly,
often leaving estimates nearly as biased as the uncorrected estimates were. For example, Simonsohn, Nelson,
and Simmons (2014b, Fig. 2) showed that when a nonexistent effect (Cohen’s d = 0) is studied with predetermined per-cell sample sizes between 5 and 35 (and there
is no p-hacking), the average statistically significant estimate is d̂ = 0.72. The trim-and-fill procedure lowers that
estimate only to d̂ = 0.70. A less well-known method is
PET-PEESE (precision-effect test and precision-effect estimate with standard error; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014).
It too performs poorly. For example, Gervais (2015) simulated a literature in which half the studies investigated a
true effect size of d = 0.40 and half investigated a true
effect size of d = 0.80. PET-PEESE estimated the true
effect to be zero.2 In our view, the use of these methods
should be discontinued.

P-Curve Analysis
In Simonsohn et al. (2014a), we introduced p-curve analysis, a statistical tool that tests whether a set of findings
contains evidential value. A set of findings contains evidential value if one can statistically rule out that selective
reporting was solely responsible for the statistically significant results that have been observed. P-curve analysis
can also be used to obtain a selective-reporting-corrected
estimate of the average statistical power of a set of studies (Simonsohn et al., 2014b).
P-curve is the observed distribution of statistically significant p values testing the hypothesis of interest from a

Simmons, Simonsohn
set of studies (i.e., ps ≤ .05). Its shape is diagnostic of
evidential value.
In the absence of p-hacking, we expect studies investigating a nonexistent (i.e., zero) effect to result in a flat
(uniform) p-curve. To understand why, consider that
when the null hypothesis is true, there is a 5% chance of
observing a p < .05, a 4% chance of observing a p < .04, a
3% chance of observing a p < .03, and so on. This means
there is a 1% chance of observing a p < .01, a 1% chance
of observing a p value between .01 and .02, a 1% chance
of observing a p value between .02 and .03, and so on.
This is what would be expected if the effect were zero
in all studies and if p-hacking were absent from all studies. When p-curve analysis includes some effects that
exist (i.e., some nonzero effects), p-curve is expected to
be right-skewed, with more low significant p values (e.g.,
.01s) than high significant p values (e.g., .04s). Thus, if at
least some of the studies in a literature are actually investigating a true effect, then more of the critical p values
will be very significant (e.g., .01s) rather than barely significant (e.g., .04s). For example, if one conducts p-curve
analysis on a literature in which half of the studies with
statistically significant findings investigated truly existent
effects (studied with 80% power), and the other half
investigated truly nonexistent effects, the resulting
p-curve would be expected to have about four times as
many p values below .01 as between .04 and .05 (also see
Cumming, 2008; Hung, O’Neill, Bauer, & Kohne, 1997;
Wallis, 1942).3
Some kinds of p-hacking, the selective reporting of
analyses conducted on the same data set, are analogous
to file-drawering, to selectively reporting studies (e.g.,
reporting results only for men or only for women). Thus,
when a studied effect does not exist, these kinds of
p-hacking are equally likely to result in low significant
p values (e.g., .01s) and high significant p values (e.g.,
.04s). In contrast, other kinds of p-hacking are disproportionately more likely to result in high significant p values
(e.g., .04s) than in low significant p values (e.g., .01s).
Thus, p-hacking generally makes p-curves flatter (i.e.,
less right-skewed) and possibly left-skewed.4
When it comes to concluding that a literature lacks
evidential value, p-curve analysis is conservative; it
occasionally results in right-skewed p-curves even in
the absence of an effect. As discussed in Simonsohn,
Simmons, and Nelson (2015), this can occur if the findings are misreported or fraudulent, or if researchers
choose the smallest possible p value from a large set of
analyses (Ulrich & Miller, 2015). Simonsohn et al., (2015)
recently revised the p-curve procedure to be more robust
to these circumstances.

Inferences From Observed P-Curves
P-curve analysis involves two tests, one examining
whether p-curve’s shape is significantly right-skewed
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and one examining whether p-curve is significantly flat.
The second test requires some explanation. In the same
way that statistical inference cannot establish that two population means are exactly the same, one cannot establish
that a distribution is exactly flat (i.e., that the “population”
frequency of ps = .01 is exactly the same as the frequency
of ps = .04). To circumvent this problem, one can rely on
the fact that how right-skewed a p-curve is expected to be
depends on the statistical power of the underlying studies.
Studies with greater power yield steeper right-skewed
p-curves (see Simonsohn et al., 2014a, 2014b). To test
whether p-curve is flat, p-curve analysis tests whether
p-curve is significantly less right-skewed than one would
expect if the studies were so underpowered as to be able
to detect a true effect only 33% of the time.5 Thus, although
one cannot establish whether p-curve is flat, one can
establish whether it is significantly flatter than would be
expected if the studies had 33% power.
This test provides protection against underpowered
p-curves. When too few studies are used for p-curve analysis, the results will be inconclusive, neither significantly
right-skewed nor significantly flat.

689

Results
Using the online p-curve app (http://www.p-curve.com),
we analyzed the 33 studies that Carney et al. (2015) cited
as evidence for the effectiveness of power posing (visit
https://osf.io/ujpyn for our p-curve disclosure table and
archived copy of R code used by the app). We had to
exclude two studies because they investigated only feelings of power (the manipulation check) rather than downstream effects of the postural manipulations. We excluded
two further studies because the critical test statistics were
unreported. In addition, our p-curve analysis necessarily
(and automatically) excluded seven p values because they
were nonsignificant. Studies in which 2 × 2 reversing
interactions were hypothesized require researchers using
p-curve analysis to enter p values from each simple effect
and thus to include two p values rather than one. For two
studies in this sample, p-curve analysis automatically
excluded one simple effect (because it was nonsignificant) but retained the other. Thus, we ultimately excluded
11 p values from 9 studies from the analysis, giving us a
final sample size of 24 p values from 24 studies (33 – 9 =
24). The resulting p-curve is shown in Figure 1.

Note: The observed p-curve includes 24 statistically significant ( p < .05) results, of which 10
are p < .025. There were 7 additional results entered but excluded from p-curve because they
were p > .05.
Fig. 1. P-curve of the 33 studies cited by Carney, Cuddy, and Yap (2015) as evidence
for the effects of power posing on downstream outcomes. The solid line shows the distribution of critical p values. It shows, for example, that 25% of the statistically significant
p values were between .04 and .05, and that 33% were between .02 and .03. The key
gives the 90% confidence interval (CI) for the estimate of the average power of the studies graphed. The dotted line shows the expected distribution of p values if there were
truly no effect, and the dashed line shows the expected distribution of p values if the
effect existed and the existing studies were powered at 33%. This figure was generated
by p-curve app 4.05.

Simmons, Simonsohn

690
We first determined whether evidential value was
present. As explained in Simonsohn et al. (2015), we
conclude that a literature contains evidential value if
either the half p-curve (which analyzes only critical p
values below .025) is significantly right-skewed at the 5%
level, or if both the half and full p-curve are significantly
right skewed at the 10% level. Neither condition was met
here (half: z = −1.24, p = .11; full: z = 0.32, p = .63).
We then compared the observed p-curve with what
would be expected when studies have an average power
of only 33%. One can conclude that there is an absence
of evidential value if the full p-curve is significantly flatter
than the 33%-power p-curve at p < .05.6 This condition
was met (full: z = −2.95, p = .0016), which allowed us to
conclusively reject the null hypothesis that the sample of
existing studies examines a detectable effect.
Finally, one can use p-curve analysis to estimate the
average power of these studies. It is only 5%, which is the
“power” we expect when the true effect size is zero and
the significance threshold is .05 (since 5% of null effects
will be significant at a threshold of .05). The 90% confidence interval around this estimate is narrow, excluding
levels of average power greater than 14%. If the same
studies were run again, it is unlikely that more than 14%
of them would replicate, and our best guess is that 5% of
them would be significant (in any direction).

Additional Analyses
Simonsohn et al. (2014a) provided detailed guidelines for
selecting test results from studies. Because we followed
those guidelines here, there was minimal ambiguity as to
which test to select from each study. Moreover, we conducted a “robustness” p-curve that included 12 valid
alternative p-value selections. The results from this analysis were very similar to the results reported in the previous section: The test for evidential value was nonsignificant
(full: p = .60, half: p = .53), and the p-curve was significantly flatter than if the studies were powered at 33% on
average (full: p = .0031); the estimate of average power
was still 5%, with a 90% confidence interval excluding
values greater than 17% (rather than 14%). Because Ranehill et al.’s replication obtained a significant effect of
power posing on the manipulation check, self-reported
power, we constructed a separate p-curve including only
the seven manipulation-check results. The resulting
p-curve was directionally right-skewed (full: p = .051,
half: p = .184). Our p-curve disclosure table (http://osf
.io/2fq9c) includes all p-value selections (and justifications), as well as everything the reader needs to easily
evaluate and reproduce our analyses.

Power of P-Curve
The conclusion that this literature lacks evidential value
cannot be explained (or explained away) by our p-curve

analysis’s lack of power. With 24 p values, our p-curve
analysis has vastly more power than the underlying studies do. For example, if the 24 studies investigating expansive versus contractive posing had 33% power on average,
then the resulting p-curve would have an 89% chance
to detect evidential value. If the 24 studies had 50%
power on average, then the resulting p-curve would have
99% power to detect evidential value. If 14 studies examined null effects, and 10 examined real effects, a p-curve
based on all 24 would have more power than those 10
studies do on average (R code for these calibrations can
be found at https://osf.io/sdgkq/). Moreover, Figure 2
shows that the results do not at all hinge on a few extreme
observations.

Set of Studies
Like all statistical analyses, p-curve analyses provide
information only about the sampled populations. The
sample of studies we analyzed consists of what Carney
et al. (2015) described as “all published tests (to our
knowledge) of expansive (vs. contractive) posture on
psychological outcomes” (p. 657). Thus, our conclusions
apply only to all studies on the effects of expansive versus contractive posing that were known to Carney et al.
in 2015. One reviewer criticized our focus on this set of
studies, believing it to be arbitrary and subjective. Thus,
it seems worthwhile to explain it.
Carney et al.’s (2015) response to the failed replication
of their work was to say that 33 other studies provided
evidence for their effects. Our goal in this commentary
was to examine whether that sample of studies contains
evidential value.
Given this objective, our set of studies was chosen for
us, not by us. Moreover, given that this sample was not
selected by Carney et al. (2015) for the purpose of conducting a p-curve analysis, it seems implausible that the
selection of studies was guided, either implicitly or explicitly, by how large or small the critical p values were. Thus,
this sample is both valid—it is by definition the population
of interest to us—and unbiased—it was not selected by
researchers interested in using p-curves to draw a particular conclusion. It is difficult to imagine a less arbitrary or
subjective way to choose a sample of studies to analyze.7

Conclusion
Taken together, the results from Ranehill et al.’s (2015)
replication and from our p-curve analysis suggest that the
behavioral and physiological effects of expansive versus
contractive postures ought to be treated as hypotheses
currently lacking in empirical support. Although more
highly powered future research may find replicable evidence for those benefits (or unexpected detriments), the
existing evidence is too weak to justify a search for
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Fig. 2. Effect of dropping the lowest and highest p values on the significance of the full p-curve test for right-skewness (top row), the half p-curve test
for right-skewness (middle row), and the test for flatness relative to 33% power (bottom row). Within each graph, the red horizontal line demarcates
the significance threshold (p = .05), and the filled marker is the result reported in the text. This figure was generated by p-curve app 4.05.

moderators or to advocate for people to engage in power
posing to better their lives.
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Notes
1. In a more recent article (Cuddy, Wilmuth, Yap, & Carney,
2015), the original authors state that they consider self-reported
feelings of power to be a manipulation check rather than an
outcome, writing that “as a manipulation check, participants
reported how dominant, in control, in charge, powerful, and
like a leader they felt on a 5-point scale” (p. 1289). Moreover,
the effects of postural manipulations on self-reported feelings
of power are susceptible to demand effects. For example, if an
experimenter asks participants to slouch for 2 min and then to
rate how powerful they feel, participants may assume that the
experimenter expects them to feel relatively powerless or may
instead answer the question, “How powerful is the pose you
just assumed?”
2. Our own simulations show that, in general, PET-PEESE estimates are virtually nondiagnostic of true effect size.
3. When studies have 80% power to detect an effect, about 72%
of significant results are expected to have a p < .01 and only
4% to have a p > .04 (see Fig. 1 in Simonsohn et al., 2014a).
Averaging each of these percentages with 20%, which is what
is expected under the null hypothesis, one sees that 47% of
significant p values would be expected to be below .01 and that
12% would be expected to be between .04 and .05.
4. The effect of p-hacking on p-curve’s shape hinges on whether
the p-hacked analyses are correlated with each other. When the
analyses are uncorrelated with each other, then p-hacking will
do the same thing to p-curve as file-drawering does (i.e., it will
make p-curve flat under the null hypothesis). When the analyses are correlated with each other, then p-hacking is more likely
to result in significant p values that are closer to .05 than to .01
(Simonsohn et al., 2014a, 2014b). See Supplement 3, “Modeling
p-hacking,” in Simonsohn et al. (2014a) for a formal analysis of
this distinction.
5. Like all cutoffs, the 33%-power cutoff is necessarily arbitrary.
Simonsohn et al. (2014a) chose it because it is a very low level
of power, as a study with 33% power would be twice as likely
to fail as to succeed. Because cutoffs are arbitrary, they should
be used as reference points rather than as meaningful categorical divides. In the case of p-curve analysis, the more strongly
one rejects the null hypothesis that the study has 33% power,
the more inconsistent the evidence is with the existence of the
hypothesized effect.
6. This test is also significant if both the binomial and the full
p-curve are flatter at p < .10.
7. The reviewer identified seven additional studies that Carney
et al. (2015) did not include in their review. The editor suggested we update our analysis by including the studies that
were published since Carney et al.’s review. Only two of the
seven studies mentioned by the reviewer potentially met
this criterion, and neither one of them actually investigated
the effects of expansive versus contractive postures. Leitan,
Williams, and Murray (2015) manipulated whether people tilted

their heads up and down (a manipulation Carney et al. explicitly chose to exclude; see the note in their Table 1). Michalak,
Rohde, and Troje (2015) manipulated whether people walked
on a treadmill in a happy versus depressed pattern. This is a
good opportunity to emphasize a critical point about the use
of p-curves: The rule guiding the selection of studies must be
set in advance and be disclosed to protect against the cherrypicking of studies. The reviewer not only suggested studies that
do not belong in the analysis, but also did not disclose an a
priori study-selection rule.
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